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The currency crisis in Korea, by its nature, had a self-fulfilling element. Therefore an 
appropriate international lender of last resort could have prevented the worst crisis.  In this 
context the characteristics of the Korean currency crisis and the role of the IMF in the Korean 
currency crisis are discussed. The IMF could not function as a proper international lender of 
last resort especially in currency crisis in Korea. Some wrong and even unnecessary 
conditionalities are required just siding with the creditors. 
To function as an efficient international lender and manager of last resort, the IMF must 
reform itself so that the demands of developing and poor countries can be properly 
accommodated. Also constructive and innovative alternatives to the current IMF should be 
continuously explored to prevent and cure future crises more efficiently and economically. A 
regional crisis lender and manager are needed desperately.  The coexistence of both regional 





The Asian crisis of 1997 reignited the discussion on the reform of international financial 
institutions. The IMF’s role in predicting, preventing, diagnosing, and providing prescriptions 
for the Asian crisis has widely been regarded as unsatisfactory.  Asian countries, which 
depended on the IMF’s stand-by credit, have doubts about the policy requirements demanded 
by the IMF. Malaysia even refused to ask for the IMF’s help and instead resorted to capital 
controls and a fixed exchange rate quite contrary to the IMF’s traditional prescription. In 
every respect the position of the IMF as an international lender of last resort has been 
seriously questioned. Most East Asian countries believe that the current IMF could not play 
the proper role in dealing with the currency crisis. I will be reviewing the crisis in Korea, 
especially in connection with the IMF.  
Instead of the current IMF, various other proposals for reforming the current international 
financial institution have been proposed.  If there is any better alternative to the current IMF 
system, it should be seriously considered. Advanced countries often led discussions on 
reform in the past but recently developing and poor countries have voiced their concerns as 
they began to recognize that a dysfunctional international financial institution could seriously 
damage them. Regional efforts to prevent the future crisis are also intensifying.  The basic 
argument is that as crises are, by nature regional and contagious, regional devices may be 
more desirable. Furthermore, East Asian countries feel closer after experiencing Asian crisis 
and witnessing the successful launching of the euro.  
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The IMF has recently faced the serious external criticism that it should be dismantled and 
a new institution should be set up or that it should be reformed thoroughly.  Others say that 
the IMF’s role has already ended with the adoption of the flexible exchange rate system in 
1973. Others still argue that only the IMF can serve as an international lender of last resort. 
The IMF, however, is going to strengthen its role as an international lender of last resort by 
expanding crisis facilities against the recurring crisis. 
Lastly I draw some policy implications on the reform of international financial 
institutions from the point of view of the Korean currency crisis.   
 
 
2. CRISIS IN KOREA AND THE IMF 
 
2.1. Causes of Crisis in Korea1 
 
After the 1997 currency crisis in Korea, much research on the causes of crisis has been 
published from inside and outside of Korea. Immediately after the crisis much of that 
research tried to find the causes of the crisis from internal weaknesses in Korea. Among 
these weaknesses were cronyism, corruption, lack of financial supervision, over-investment 
by the ‘chaebol,’ and the deterioration of the current account. First generation theorists of 
speculative attack currency crisis tend to relate deteriorating macroeconomic fundamentals 
with the outburst of crisis. It cannot be denied that these weaknesses are necessary conditions 
of crisis.  However, it is insufficient to attribute the crisis to these weak fundamentals only.  
It is also argued that microeconomic rather than macroeconomic conditions are more 
important in understanding the crisis. That would be also true but these microeconomic 
inefficiencies existed even several decades ago. If these conditions were really sufficient 
conditions of crisis, mainland China would have had a crisis instead of Korea. Asian 
countries including Korea have had these problems long before the crisis. 
Unprepared financial and capital liberalization resulted in a boom and bust crisis in Korea. 
From the early nineties the IMF and OECD strongly pushed capital market opening to 
developing countries, arguing that capital liberalization would contribute to increasing the 
welfare of the whole world. This pressure was strongest especially before Korea entered the 
OECD in 1997. Massive capital flew into the Asian countries including Korea.  We can see 
from Table 1 that capital inflows jumped up from 2.6 billion dollars in 1990 to 23.3 billion 
dollars in 1996. These excessive capital inflows caused excessive spending and a current 
account deficit. Furthermore the weak yen and terms of trade deterioration added to the 
widening current account deficit. Additionally a crisis in Thailand spread to neighboring 
countries like a flu. In 1996, the current account deficit in Korea amounted to 23 billion 
dollars. We can easily confer that this current account deficit was hardly sustainable. 
Furthermore Korean banks borrowed in dollars and in short-term and lent in won and in 
long-term. Foreign reserves were not enough compared with the amount of short-term 
external debt. Korea’s short-term external debt comprised more than 55% of the total as is 
shown from the above Table 1. As foreign banks suddenly stopped rolling over the existing 
debt in Korea, Korean banks had a kind of liquidity shortage. Korea had a banking crisis and 
urrency crisis at the same time. In this context crisis in Korea is self-fulfilling like a bank run 
model of Diamond and Dybvig(1983). 
                                                        
1 Refer to Choi (2001). 
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Until Korea had a crisis, the IMF did not or could not give us the signal that a crisis was 
impending. In fact, the IMF actually praised the Korean economy up until the crisis.  Here I 
am explaining the IMF’s role before the crisis in two respects.  The first probable case is that 
the IMF was well aware of the forthcoming problem already and it did not notify Korea.  
Some Koreans refer to this case as a ‘conspiracy’ of the IMF and developed countries. In 
addition, the IMF had already a lot of crisis experiences from other countries including 
Mexico and it was equipped with the most capable economists in the world. Even if not 100 
percent correctly, the crisis could have been predicted from inside the IMF.  The second case 
is that the IMF could not predict crisis in Korea at all, as they were really ignorant about the 
characteristics of recurring crisis in the world. If the IMF is really going to be an 
international lender of last resort in the real sense, the IMF is to blame for the currency crisis 
in either case. 
Furthermore the IMF imposed too harsh reform plans on the Korean economy that 
disguised their mistakes. Here I stress that the IMF’s moral hazard is the most serious 
concerning the crisis especially in East Asian countries.  It is the IMF itself who compelled 
developing countries to adopt capital and financial liberalization without regard to the 
different economic development stages of the relevant countries.  It is a wonder why the IMF 
did not force labour market liberalization all over the world. The labour market liberalization 
as well as the capital market liberalization would have increased welfare in the world 
economy. 
 
Table 1.  Economic Indicators Related with the Currency Crisis 
                                                                                                                                          (%) 
 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 
GDP growth rate (%) 9.0 9.2 5.4 5.5 8.3 8.9 6.8 5.0 
Terms of trade (1995=100) 94.2 97.0 95.5 98.7 100 90.5 88.1 84.2 
Current account (bil. dollars) -2.0 -8.3 -3.9 1.0 -3.9 -8.5 -23.0 -8.2 
Capital account (bil. dollars) 2.6 6.4 6.6 2.7 10.3 16.8 23.3 1.3 
Foreign reserves (bil. dollars) 14.8 13.7 17.2 20.3 25.7 32.7 33.2 20.4 
Current Account/GDP (%) -0.8 -2.8 -1.3 0.3 -1.0 -1.9 -4.7 -1.9 
Fiscal Account/GDP (%) 0.4 -0.8 -0.3 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.0 0.0 
Total external debt (bil. dollars) - - - - 72.9 127.5 163.5 159.2 
Long-term (bil. dollars) - - - - 43.5 55.6 70.2 95.7 
Short-term (bil. dollars) - - - - 53.9 71.9 93.3 63.6 
Source: Choi(2001) 
 
2.2. The IMF Program in Korea 
 
Towards the end of 1997, the Bank of Korea failed to defend the abruptly depreciating 
won and almost exhausted its foreign reserves. Finally, the Korean government asked for the 
IMF’s help and had to reach an agreement with the IMF on December 3, 1997. Even though 
the Korean government withdrew approximately 11.1 billion dollars out of a 58 billion dollar 
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rescue package2 , foreign creditors continued to pull their investments out from Korean 
financial institutions. International credit rating agencies downgraded Korea’s sovereign 
credit rating on December 11, 1997. On December 24, 1997 the IMF and major 
industrialized countries including G-7 announced their decision to further frontload their 
financial assistance. More important, however, is the fact that the financial institutions of the 
major advanced countries agreed to tentatively roll-over their exposure to Korea for one 
month. On January 28, 1998, the Korean government and foreign commercial banks reached 
a final agreement on the principles for maturity extensions. Finally the contracts were signed 
on April 8, whereby 96.4% of 22.65 billion dollars in short-term debts extended to Korean 
commercial banks were converted to long-term maturity of one to three years. This enabled 
Korea’s commercial banks to improve their foreign currency position and allowed Korea’s 
foreign exchange market to regain stability (MOFE 1999). 
To understand the IMF’s intervention in the Korean economy let us briefly summarize 
the program imposed upon the Korean economy. The IMF program was an austerity program 
that enforced several structural reforms. In order to improve the current account, fiscal 
contraction and high interest rate were required. At the initial stage of the program fiscal 
tightening was inappropriate. Radelet and Sachs (1998) argued that fiscal tightening in the 
program could not improve the current account and simply added to the contractionary   
force of the crisis. Here the fiscal contraction was subsequently dropped as the crisis was 
found not to result from the fiscal side. As we can see from Table 1, the fiscal account was 
almost in equilibrium unlike the case of past crisis countries. A flexible exchange rate policy 
was recommended with interventions limited to smoothing operations. 
Financial restructuring included strengthening prudential regulation by monetary 
authorities, revocation of licenses of several merchant banks, and rationalization of the 
commercial financial institution. Capital account and trade liberalization was accelerated 
further. In addition the IMF required transparency of relevant statistics such as foreign 
exchange reserves and short-term external debt. 
This harsh program almost drove the Korean economy into a credit crunch. The eight 
percent BIS ratio is used as the only critical criterion of bank existence.  It is very natural that 
many illiquid but solvent Korean firms, which traditionally had a high debt-to-equity ratio, 
regardless of whether good or not, went bankrupt.   
 
2.3. The IMF’s Role as the International Lender of Last Resort in the Korean Crisis 
 
Many lessons from the crisis in Korea can be drawn.  I, however, am going to draw them 
in relation with the role of the IMF as an international lender of last resort. The Korean crisis 
was due to liquidity shortage and similar to Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) explanation of 
bank runs (Chang and Velasco 1998). In any state of the economy, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
                                                        
2 Total of 58.35 billion dollars are committed by international organizations and second line of 
defense. International organizations committed 35.0 billion dollars (the IMF: 21 billion dollars, IBRD: 
10.0 billion dollars, ADB: 4.0 billion dollars) and 23.35 billion dollars of second line of defense is 
committed in case the funds from international organizations prove to be insufficient (Japan: 10.0 
billion dollars, US: 5.0 billion dollars, Germany, UK, France, Italy: 5.0 billion dollars, Belgium, 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden: 1.25 billion dollars, Australia: 1.0 billion dollars, Canada: 1.0 
billion dollars, New Zealand: 0.1 billion dollars). Total of 21 billion dollars committed by the IMF is 
composed of stand-by credit (7.6 billion dollars) and SRF (Supplemental Reserve Facility, 13.4 billion 
dollars). 
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equilibria coexist at the same time.3 For any country not to fall on a bad equilibrium for 
temporary shortage of liquidity, an international lender of last resort is needed.  
Concerning the lender of last resort, we can borrow Bagehot’s (1873) idea that, in a crisis, 
the lender of last resort should lend freely to temporarily illiquid but solvent banks, at 
penalty rates on good collateral.  His basic idea can be easily applied to the IMF’s role as an 
international lender of last resort in the currency crisis of Korea. To ‘lend freely’ implicitly 
means that the lender of last resort has access to resources that, if not actually unlimited, are 
at least well in excess of the largest need which could materialize in a crisis. The IMF did not 
‘lend freely’ to Korea. The amount, which was committed by the IMF, was not enough to 
stop the capital outflows immediately after the IMF got involved in the crisis. The total 
amount committed by the IMF was much smaller than the short-term external debt of Korea. 
To prevent a moral hazard from emergency lending and ensure the quick retirement of 
emergency finance once the crisis is over, imposing ‘penalty rates on good collateral’ is 
needed. Higher surcharges than the international interest rate were imposed on the 
emergency loan to Korea. In addition to the higher rate, they imposed overly harsh 
conditions. As authorities in Korea already recognized the excessive cost of the IMF 
emergency loan, they were extremely hesitant about the loan and made efforts to cope with 
the crisis themselves. Imposing penalty rates on the crisis loan would have been enough to 
induce the crisis country to repay the loan as soon as possible.  
The problem was that even after IMF’s initial intervention in the Korean crisis, the crisis 
continued. The IMF alone surely could not play the role of crisis lender and manager. The 
crisis was not resolved actually until the G-7 committed their support for Korea and a roll-
over agreement with major creditors was arranged. 4  The IMF and advanced countries 
including the G-7 together played a role of crisis lender and manager. Therefore while 
dealing with the crisis, the IMF could not be impartial. 
To avoid a moral hazard in relation with the emergency loan, ‘constructive ambiguity’ is 
often cited. Uncertain crisis loan lending can reduce the moral hazard of debtor country.  I 
feel that the current ‘constructive ambiguity’ changed too easily into ‘destructive ambiguity’ 
by placing a large degree of discretion in the hands of the agency responsible for crisis 
management, which can be biased towards creditor country.  
I would like to add that to be a capable international lender of last resort, the lender must 
have a full understanding of the economy before a crisis hits. Ironically, the IMF’s 1997 
annual report praised the soundness of Korea and Thailand’s economic fundamentals. 
Shortly after their appraisal of both economies, the crisis occurred. This means that the IMF 
itself did not understand the possibility of a crisis beforehand.  
The fact that they wanted a contractionary fiscal policy shows their ignorance about 
Korean economy. As we reviewed in the previous section, the Korean crisis was not caused 
by weak fundamentals only. Rather it is really self-fulfilling and relaxing the creditors are the 
most important issue in this case. Economic reform should be the long-term goal of the 
program rather than a short-term one. Feldstein (1998) also criticized the IMF 
conditionalities as inappropriately detailed and microeconomic. Further he argues that it is 
inappropriate for an international agency to intrude so deeply into domestic economic policy, 
                                                        
3 Refer to Choi (2001) as to the self-fulfilling characteristics of Korean currency crisis. 
4 The reason why GAB could not be utilized is that it has a double-lock system, as it needs the        
approval of GAB member countries and the IMF Executive Board. That kind of complexity can explain 
the uselessness of GAB in crisis country where emergency funding is necessary (Giannini 1999). 
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especially since its charter provides no mandate to do so. If the main goal of program had 
been to reverse the current account, imposing a higher rate than market rate on the bailout 
loan would have made the country seek a current account surplus.  I mean that the crisis 
country should reserve policy flexibility. The IMF seemed to attain some other objects 
through the program.  The program even included additional trade and capital liberalizations, 
which are not related with improving the current account at all. The high interest rate policy 
prescribed by the IMF could not stop runs on the currency and even exacerbated financial 
problems in manufacturing companies, which led to more bankruptcies and a large increase 
in the exposure of bad loans in the banking sector.   
 
 
3. VARIOUS PROPOSALS TO REFORM INTERNATIOANL  
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION 
 
Can the market solve the current crisis properly? The answer may be ‘No.’ Many East 
Asian countries were forced to open their capital market by advanced countries and 
international financial institutions.  In some sense capital and labour are production factors. 
Until recently the economists in the advanced countries have often stressed the benefit of 
global capital liberalization. Economists in advanced countries seldom advocate the logic 
that “global labour liberalization” is the same as “global capital liberalization.” Fast and 
unprepared global labour market liberalization will, at least temporarily, make the workers in 
advanced countries poorer than at present. Here I am not calling for labour market 
liberalization in the world.  It seems to me that economists around the world have now begun 
to realize the possibility of the rampage of financial globalization in the world. 
So far the market does not seem to have resolved the currency crisis even if Schwarz 
(1998) contends that the IMF should be abolished as it precludes more effective market 
solutions. If she really believed in the free market of the world, she must advocate labour 
market liberalization. The market already proved to be incapable of preventing and curing 
currency crises in the world. In this context Krugman says that the IMF as an international 
lender of last resort is perhaps flawed, but “all we have, and it is a lot better than nothing at 
all.” 
If the market cannot prevent and solve the crisis, then other measures can be suggested as 
follows. Granting that the current IMF flawed, what other measures can be suggested?  By 
overviewing various ideas on how to prevent and cure the crisis properly, we can get a 
balanced view of the current IMF system and also have a vision for international financial 
institutions. 
 
3.1. Building International Institution5 
 
Sachs (1999) argues that an international bankruptcy court is needed to deal with crisis. 
When there is a financial panic, suspension on the existing debt could be possible as in 
domestic bankruptcy law. Without the bankruptcy law, in times of emergency, all creditors 
will demand their shares at the same time. In this case domestic bankruptcy court can 
provide some breathing room so that creditors do not liquidate or abandon potentially high-
                                                        
5  Refer to Rogoff (1999). 
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yield productive investment projects. This can be easily extended to the international context. 
Similarly this can stop the competitive outflow of capital from the crisis country.  
He explains that the Korean crisis did not end on December 4, 1997, when $58 billion of 
the IMF package came into shape, but on December 29, 1997, when the Fed engineered a 
roll-over of short-term debts and everybody breathed a sigh of relief that we were no longer 
playing on a day-to-day basis in Korea. So the normal way that these panics end is not 
necessarily through the infusion of new capital, but rather the suspension of repayment of 
short-term debt.  
Further he argues that by analogy, in the bankruptcy context, under the US Law, for 
example, we usually allow the bankrupt to gain access to working capital by prioritizing the 
new lending, the post-bankruptcy debt, under section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code. Instead of 
the IMF loan, we could arrange debtor-in-possession financing. We do not need an official 
creditor to lend.  What the bankruptcy judge does is to say that the next $100 million tranche 
is going to have priority over the pre-bankruptcy debt.  Especially this kind of new loan will 
be very critical to trade financing. This solution is closer to the market than the current 
regime. 
Finally in domestic bankruptcy law we end up cancelling debt on debt overhang. One 
way to relieve the burden on an international lender of last resort would be actually to get rid 
of bad debt. Litian et al. (1998) have suggested that borrowing countries should pass 
legislation contemplating a mandatory reduction (“hair-cut”) of the principal of foreign 
currency loans that are not rolled over in the event of a crisis. Creditors would not be 
prevented form leaving the country, but would be imposed a loss for doing so. A more 
extreme case will be a moratorium on foreign payments.  
However, there still remain problems to be solved in this idea.  If the world government 
and court exist like in an individual country, this could be one of the solutions to the crisis.  
Unlike domestic bankruptcy case it is very difficult to replace the “board of directors” of a 
crisis country. Eichengreen and Portes (1995) assume that an international bankruptcy 
system is not feasible and perhaps not even desirable. 
Soros (1988) contends that setting up an international deposit insurance corporation 
equivalent to the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation would help prevent a bank run 
style crisis. Originally deposit insurance is devised to prevent a ‘bank run.’ As the current 
crisis is similar to a bank run, setting up a global deposit insurance would be able to prevent 
a bank run in the international context.  By imposing higher insurance fees for riskier lending, 
it can control banks’ activity. Uninsured countries, however, cannot be left alone during a 
crisis. It is still a difficult task to calculate proper insurance fees. Lastly it is doubtful whether 
to endow a regulatory power with any global deposit insurance institution can be 
acknowledged or not. 
Kaufman (1998) suggests that an international financial regulator would help prevent a 
crisis in the future. It is needed to harmonize currently decentralized financial regulations.  In 
this context the 1988 and 1999 Basle Accords can be very good devices. These Accords 
impose a uniform capital adequacy standard so that banks avoid high risk-high return 
projects. It is designed so that banks will maintain certain ratio of capital to risk-weighted 
assets. Therefore as banks invest in riskier assets, they have to accumulate more capital.  It is 
rather uncertain which regulator system is better, national or global. Under the national 
regulator system, there may be some competition among national regulators and banks may 
bypass the inefficient regulatory policy of their own country. This competition may make a 
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regulator system more efficient than a global one. A global financial regulator, however, will 
be unavoidable and will become inefficient.  
When we think of a role of lender of last resort, the liquidity should be supplied 
sufficiently to extinguish a crisis in the market. Garten (1998) argues that a world central 
bank can do that kind of role in emergency. Considering the current shortage of facilities of 
the IMF, this seems to make sense. There may be criticisms about this idea. In a global 
currency, we may lack competition among key currencies in enhancing anti-inflationary 
performance and competition among key currencies will enhance the anti-inflation 
performance. Another criticism may be that adopting a global currency may prohibit 
countries from undertaking their own monetary policy. Nowadays the dollar is used as a 
quasi-global currency and basically the production and circulation is only left to the US only. 
Despite the above-mentioned criticisms, global currency can have the following advantages. 
Seigniorage can be available by a neutral agency rather than by a few advanced countries 
only. Compared with the current IMF, it can supply crisis countries with liquidity more 
rationally and neutrally.   
So far the IMF and OECD pushed capital liberalization too quickly.  It is always possible 
that extreme volatility of capital flows and a financial liberalization can drive developing 
countries into a financial turmoil. It may be the time for us to widen the policy choices of 
each country depending on their stages of economic development. Malaysia adopted 
Krugman’s (1998) recommendation of controls on capital outflows amidst crisis. He argues 
that capital controls would be a better idea when the lender of last resort does not function 
properly. It looked very dangerous for any country in crisis to adopt a capital control, but 
Malaysia utilized it successfully. Compared with other East Asian crisis countries, which 
were forced to undertake a severe contractionary policy and sharp depreciation, the cost of 
recovery in Malaysia does not seem so big. The IMF and advanced countries may not 
welcome this success story of Malaysia. Definitely controls on capital outflows proved to 
work well in emergency period. It also proved that the IMF intervention need not be the only 
unique solution for crisis and that the IMF currently cannot function as a reliable 
international lender of last resort. The Tobin tax proposed by Tobin (1978) can be considered 
in this context. ‘Putting sand in the wheels’ may be necessary in currently unstable 
international capital flows. 
Controls on capital inflows may also be useful, too. For example Chile required that all 
non-equity foreign capital inflows be accompanied by a non-interest bearing one-year 
deposit in the central bank equal to 30 percent of the initial value of the investment from 
May 1992 to May 1998 inducing longer stay of foreign capital in Chile. Therefore the shorter 
the borrowing period is, the higher the cost of borrowing becomes. This can curb down the 
speculative capital inflows to any country. Columbia adopted a similar system in 1993. 
These capital taxes in Chile and Columbia turned out to help improve the debt maturity 
structure by imposing a kind of implicit tax on short-term capital inflow. 
 
3.2. Regional Efforts to Prevent Crisis 
 
Recently we witnessed the trend towards both globalism and regionalism in trade. The 
coexistence of WTO and NAFTA is such an example. There is not an explicit regional 
apparatus among the East Asian countries so far. Especially in trade arrangement there have 
been some discussions about the necessity of a regional free trade area in East Asian 
countries. After experiencing the crisis in the region, most East Asian countries seriously felt 
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the need to form regional arrangements so that regional surveillance and cooperation could 
take place. Before the crisis this movement was rather weak in Japan. After the crisis, 
however, Japan has become very active in this movement. Other East Asian countries agree 
with Japan’s initiative. Still there remain worries about the strengthening role of Japan. As 
we have seen in Korean case, the IMF could not properly anticipate and prescribe for the 
crisis. Some of the IMF conditionalities were unnecessarily harsh and wrongly prescribed 
and the debt solution was not fair to debtor countries. It means that the current IMF does not 
care as much as it should be required for the countries concerned, especially in the East 
Asian regions. Malaysia even refused to call in the IMF’s help and they managed the crisis in 
their own way. They succeeded in coping with the crisis. It is very natural that the movement 
towards regional monetary cooperation becomes intensified. 
In some sense this idea is not the first one. Already European countries are equipped with 
a regional device to stabilize the currency in the region. The launching of euro may be a 
good example of regional monetary cooperative mechanism. This can explain why European 
countries feel relatively safer now than without the adoption of euro despite the recent drop 
in the value of euro against dollar. This kind of regional monetary cooperation movement 
can also be observed in the North American countries recently. The reason why the US is 
against East Asian monetary cooperation is based on the concern that they may lose the 
international seigniorage of US dollars. As the dollar is one of the most competitive exports 
to Asian countries, they do not want any substitute of dollar in the region. Financial 
instability in the region will increase the precautionary demand for the dollar in the region.  
However, it is time for the US to reconsider the role of dollar in the world economy. The US 
may recognize this kind of liquidity problem if the US dollar is seriously challenged as a key 
currency in the world by euro or some other currency.  
Regional crisis lender and manager can be supported for the following reasons(Giannini  
1999). First geographical proximity may be the most important advantage compared with 
international financial institutions. Secondly since the number of countries involved being by 
definition smaller, it may be easier at the regional level to win a consensus on both the need 
for concerted action and the policies that countries should take. Finally relatively deep-rooted 
cultural ties-which again can be expected to be the natural outcome of proximity-may 
provide a favourable terrain for the establishment of an “epistemic community,” namely of 
“a professional group that believes in the same cause-and-effect relationships, truth tests to 
accept them, and shares common values so that its members show a common understanding 
of a problem and its solution(Haas 1995: 55).” 
Unlike the EU’s case, the international community is not so amenable to the cooperative 
movement among the Asian countries. Asian countries including Korea felt seriously the 
need to cooperate with each other to get their proper rights back from the current 
international financial system. Regional devices are very important in checking the 
monopoly power of the IMF as an international lender of last resort. Here I will explain 
several visions of regional cooperation among East Asian countries. 
When Korea had a crisis, cooperation among the East Asian countries proved to be very 
critical. As the recent crisis is regional, policy coordination among the Asian countries is 
really important. The Korean crisis is indirectly related with unsound Japanese banks as well 
as Korean banks. Before the crisis, Japanese banks withdrew their loans from Korea, which 
actually triggered the outburst of crisis in Korea. The crisis in the neighbouring countries 
also influenced the crisis in Korea. When East Asian countries had a crisis, China did not 
devalue the yuan in order not to aggravate the neighbouring country’s current account. This 
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shows that macroeconomic policy coordination of neighbouring countries is very important. 
Especially concerted efforts of East Asian countries are needed to complement the current 
international financial institution that lacks the full capacity to deal with regional crisis.  
Dialogue among the Asian countries to discuss regional problems should be continued on a 
regular basis. Strengthening the regional financial surveillance and developing regional 
financial markets are also very important to stabilize the regional financial market.  
Stabilizing exchange rates among Asian countries will be necessary to promote the trade and 
capital flows in the region. 
When a country faces crisis, central banks in the East Asian countries can share their 
foreign reserves by swap arrangement. On January 15, 1999, as part of the Miyazawa Plan, 
the Japanese government agreed to provide a back-up facility of 5 billion dollars to the Bank 
of Korea in the form of a central bank swap arrangement. If necessary, this facility will be 
activated for trade-related financing, assistance for small and medium-sized firms, and 
funding for economic stimulus measures. Recently central banks in East Asian countries 
continue to expand contracts with each other to share liquidity during a crisis. This, however, 
can act only as a back-up facility not as a perfect solution. 
Japan proposed an “Asian Monetary Fund (AMF)” to prevent the recurrence of the Asian 
currency crisis and to institutionalize financial cooperation among countries within the 
region at the ASEM finance ministers’ meeting in Bangkok on September 19, 1997. An 
undisclosed meeting of deputy finance ministers from twelve Asian nations was held on 
September 21 at the request of Japan during the IMF/World Bank annual meeting. They were 
Korea, Japan, China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, 
Singapore and New Zealand. The US and a representative of the IMF attended the meeting 
with observer status. The IMF and US opposed the plan worrying that an AMF may weaken 
the existing international financial architecture under the IMF. The meeting adjourned 
without agreeing on the details. However, discussions on the AMF are still going on among 
the East Asian countries. The slightly different form from the AMF is the APMF. The APMF 
(Asia Pacific Monetary Fund) proposed by Bergsten (1998) is a modification of the AMF. I, 
however, think that the real intention of the APMF is to discourage AMF, not to propose an 
alternative to the AMF. The APMF may encounter similar problems to APEC, which seemed 
to be not working properly because of different interests. 
Immediately after the Asian crisis in 1997, ASEAN countries considered adopting their 
own common currency in the region. This has not been formalized yet. A single currency in 
the region may be the strongest form of regional monetary cooperation. A regional single 
currency may be more feasible than a global single currency. European countries adopted the 
euro as their regional currency. Latin American countries continue to adopt dollarization.  
Recently ‘amero’ in the North American Monetary Union is proposed by Grubel (2000). In 
Asia, however, there is no currency that can be utilized as a regional common currency.  
Adopting single currency means the abandoning member country’s monetary policy or 
sovereignty in some sense. It may not be that easy in East Asian countries. Heterogeneity 
among East Asian countries is referred to as an obstacle to regional single currency. Recent 
dollarization in some Latin American countries, however, is not based on homogeneous 
macroeconomic background.6 The yen, as a regional currency in the area, may be difficult for 
several reasons. The role of the yen in the East Asian countries is weaker than that of the 
dollar in the north and South American countries. 
                                                        
6 Dollarization, however, still has the problem of seigniorage monopoly by the US. 
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3.3. IMF’s Reponses 
 
It may be very natural that the IMF would say that creating another global or regional 
financial institution is redundant and wasteful and they may well advocate the current IMF 
for themselves (Fischer 2000). If the IMF continues to hold that line, reforming the current 
IMF will be unavoidable. To handle criticisms of the operation of the IMF, the IMF recently 
strengthened the role of the Interim Committee. The IMF’s Board of Governors adopted a 
resolution approving a proposal of the Executive Board to transform the Interim Committee 
of the Board of Governors on the International Monetary System into the International 
Monetary and Financial Committee of the Board of Governors on September 30, 1999. In 
addition to the name change, the Board of Governors explicitly provided for preparatory 
meetings of representatives of the Committee members. The new Committee continues to 
advise and report to the Board of Governors with respect to the functions of the Board of 
Governors(IMF 2000b: 48). 
Furthermore the IMF has been forced to reform itself as a better international crisis 
manager and lender. Already there existed facilities, which can be used for emergency 
financing. The financial assistance provided by the IMF is made available to member 
countries under a number of policies, the terms of which reflect the balance of payments 
problem that the borrower is experiencing.   
Recently the IMF shortened the repurchase expectation of the existing facilities to ensure 
efficient use of Fund resources(IMF 2000c). Around 40 percent of the IMF credit has been 
provided through a Stand-By Arrangement (SBA), which is designed to deal with short-term 
balance of payments problems of a temporary or cyclical nature and must be repaid within 
two and one-fourth to four years, as compared with repurchase obligations that span three 
and one-fourth to five years. The member would be expected to meet these expectations, but 
the Fund could extend them on request by the member, if the Board agreed that the 
member’ s external position had not improved sufficiently for repurchases to be made. 
Financial assistance through extended arrangements under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF), 
which was introduced in 1974, is intended for countries with balance of payments difficulties 
resulting primarily from structural problems and has longer repayment periods, four and a 
half to seven years, rather than to 10 years currently, to take account of the need to 
implement reforms that can take longer to put in place and have full impact(IMF 2000). 
Access limit is decided by the sum of SBA and EFF in relation to the quota and is 100 
percent of quota annually and 300 percent cumulatively. The surcharge would begin at a 
level of 100 basis points at 200 percent of quota, and would rise to 200 basis points with 
credit outstanding above 300 percent of quota 
The IMF has been trying to strengthen its role as an international lender of last resort.7 At 
the end of 1997, the IMF introduced the Supplemental Reserve Facility(SRF), which can 
make short-term loans in large amounts at penalty rates to countries in crisis. SRF Loans 
have been made to Korea, Russia, and Brazil, subject to policy conditionality.  
Shortly after the establishment of the SRF, the IMF turned its attention to the creation of 
a facility that would help prevent the spread of capital account-driven crises. The result was 
the establishment of the CCL in May 1999. It takes the form of an addition to the IMF’s 
                                                        
7 Refer to Goodhart and Huang (1999) on the theoretical model of lender of last resort 
and Fischer (1999) and Giannini (1998) for international perspectives on the lender of last 
resort. 
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existing decision on the Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF). A key difference is that the 
SRF is for use by members already in the throes of crisis, whereas the CCL is a preventive 
measure intended solely for members that are concerned with potential vulnerability to 
contagion, but are not facing a crisis at the time of commitment. The SRF is used to provide 
financial assistance for exceptional balance of payments difficulties owing to a large short-
term financing need resulting from a sudden and disruptive loss of market confidence, like 
during the Mexican and Asian financial crises of 1995 and 1997. Under the SRF, repayments 
are expected to be made within one to one and a half years but can be extended to two to two 
and a half years. SRF drawings are made within the context of a Stand-By or Extended 
Arrangement but are not subject to a specific quota limit.  
The CCL is available, in the absence of a crisis and as a precautionary mechanism, only 
to members that satisfy eligibility criteria.  No member has yet made use of the CCL(IMF 
2000a). To be eligible for the CCL, member countries should prove to adopt prudent 
macroeconomic policies.  Recently eligibility has been weakened to increase the 
automaticity of the CCL by dropping some of its clauses.8 Similarly, commitments and, upon 
activation, drawings under the CCL are made within the context of a Stand-By Arrangements 
and are not subject to general access limits, but commitments under the CCL would be 
expected to be in the range of 300 to 500 percent of the member’s quota in the Fund, unless 
otherwise warranted by exceptional circumstances, and with due regard to the Fund’s 
liquidity position (See Table 1). Countries drawing under the CCL are expected to repay 
within one to one and a half years of the date of each disbursement (The Board may extend 
this repayment period by up to one year). The penalty rate applies to the CCL. During the 
first year following the first drawing of CCL resources, the member will pay a surcharge of 
150 basis points above the rate of charge on the regular IMF drawings. The surcharge would 






                                                        
8  Eligibility under the CCL can be summarized as follows; (1) that, at the time of 
commitment, is implementing policies that are considered unlikely to give rise to a need to 
use Fund resources; (2) whose policies have received a positive assessment from the Fund at 
its last Article IV consultation and whose policies have continued to be assessed favorably 
by the Fund thereafter based on economic indicators reflecting domestic stability and 
external sustainability, and taking into account the extent of the member’s adherence to 
relevant internationally-accepted standards; in particular, the member would have subscribed 
to the Special Data Dissemination Standard and be judged to be making satisfactory progress 
towards meeting its requirements; (3) that is maintaining constuctive relations with its 
private creditors with a view to facilitaing appropriate involvement of the private sector, and 
has made satisfactory progress in limiting external vulnerability through the management of 
the level and structure of its external debt and international reserves; and (4) that has 
submitted a satisfactory economic and financial program, including a quatified framework, 
which the member stands ready to adjust as needed.  To increase the automaticity of CCL, 
(3) and (4) are dropped on September 18, 2000. 
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Table2. Access limits, April 1999 
(In percent of member’s quota) 
Facility or Policy Limits 
Stand-By and Extended Arrangements1)  
Annual 100 
Cumulative 300 
Special Facilities  
Supplemental Reserve Facility/Contingent Credit Lines None 
Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility  
Export earnings shortfall2) 20 
Excess cereal import costs2) 10 
Contingency financing 15 
Optional tranche 20 
Buffer Stock Financing Facility 25 
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility  
Three-year access  
Regular 190 
Exceptional           185 
Source: the IMF Annual Report 1999, p. 99. 
Note: 1) Under exceptional circumstances, these limits may be extended. 
2) When a member has a satisfactory balance of payments position except for the effect of an     
    export earnings shortfall or excess in cereal import costs, a limit of 45 percent of the quota  
    applies to either the export earnings shortfall or the excess cereal import cost, with a joint  
    limit of 55 percent. 
 
 
4. POLICY IMPLICATIONS ON THE REFORM OF INTERNATIONAL  
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION 
 
4.1. Reform of International Financial Institution 
 
Without a sufficient lender of last resort, the benefit of capital liberalization is very 
doubtful. Countries, which cannot print the dollar, should prepare as much foreign reserves 
as they import from abroad. Capital inflows then become always costly to developing 
countries. 
I fear that foreign banks are learning that they can lend without fear of default because of 
the implicit protection of the IMF and G-7 (Calomiris 1998). Imprudent lenders as well as 
imprudent borrowers should be penalized on an equal basis. The incentive structure of the 
IMF should be set up so that prevention of crisis will be the first priority rather than the 
solution of crisis. The more often the crises, the more influential the IMF becomes without 
any penalty on the IMF. We know that crises repeat themselves and that after any crisis the 
IMF gets bigger and stronger without any penalty.  
In Korea he who worked hard in solving the crisis got an award, but he who worked hard 
in order to prevent the crisis got nothing. It means that to be awarded there should be a crisis 
in the future in Korea and the IMF. This is to say, the incentive structure is wrongly set up 
now. The IMF should be responsible for the prevention of currency crisis in the future. Just 
replacing the top manager of the IMF with another person may not be sufficient. They should 
compete with other institutions for the same function to be more efficient, whether it be 
regional institute or private or other alternative. The market principle should apply to the 
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lender of last resort. Once they fail to win the game they should get out of the market. We 
learned in basic economics that a monopoly is not good and competition makes a firm more 
efficient. This may apply to the international lender of last resort role in the international 
context. 
Moratoria and trading facilities could be one of the options in face of currency crisis. 
Moratoria can work as a ‘stick’ to the creditors through revising the ArticleVIII.2(b). 
Giannini (1999) suggests that the international community can have a legal means of 
temporarily suspending not only the country’s foreign payments, but also the creditors’ legal 
rights by clarifying that the expression “exchange contracts” is to be interpreted as 
encompassing credit agreements.9 
As we have reviewed in the previous sessions, the role of the IMF as an international 
lender of last resort, if strengthened, still has a lot of shortcomings. I still do not think that the 
next crisis can be successfully prevented and cured rationally despite the recent efforts of the 
IMF. Therefore very insightful alternative ideas including Sachs’ should be seriously studied 
and considered not only by the IMF but also by academia. I understand that there still remain 
problems to be solved in his suggestion. His idea, however, is very intuitive and persuasive. 
Frankly the most difficult part would be the opposition of the current international financial 
institution rather than the immaturity of any alternative. It is likely that the IMF will always 
downgrade any other alternative instinctly as it is a bureaucracy. The international community 
should make every effort to devise a better institution than the current system. 
We have seen that the IMF is striving to reform itself as a better international lender and 
manager of the crisis. In addition the IMF should also spend considerable portion of their 
efforts to meet the needs of regional and developing countries’. They should try to reflect the 
developing and poor countries’ voices in their decision making process more seriously, as 
they are always the victims of the current malfunctioning international financial system in 
some sense. 
If the IMF is really going to perform a role of international lender of last resort, the role 
of the IMF should be confined to that purpose.  In this context I personally agree with the 
suggestion of the Meltzer Report (2000) that the IMF should restrict its lending to the 
provision of short-term liquidity to strengthen the IMF’s role as international crisis lender. 
After the change from fixed exchange rate system to flexible exchange rate system, the IMF 
lost its own roles.  
When the IMF prescribes conditionality for a crisis country, they should focus more on a 
macroeconomic policy direction rather than microeconomic reforms. Currently the IMF’s 
conditionality seems to be too kind and too specific.  World Bank rather than the IMF should 
be in charge of microeconomic reforms.  The IMF does not seem to have perfect information 
about a specific country. When they impose IMF program on a crisis country, 
microeconomic policy options should be left to the crisis country. The role of World Bank or 
Asian Development Bank is basically providing development loans. Therefore the role of 
international lender of last resort should not be expected too much from these development 
banks. Rather they should increase their role in developing and helping poor countries that 
are afflicted with globalization and poverty.  
                                                        
9 Presently it states “exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and which are 
contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or imposed consistently with 
this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of any member.” 
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The operation of the IMF should be more transparent to member countries. Recently 
some measures to make the IMF’s operation more transparent have been undertaken. Now 
transparency of the IMF is required as much as the IMF requires transparency of the member 
countries. 
Moral hazard also exists in the IMF as well as in the creditors and debtors. Expanding 
quotas of the IMF and blaming the crisis countries for their mismanagement of the economy 
have always been repeated after the outbreak of past crisis. The real problem is that crisis, 
however, could not be stopped even by the existence of the IMF for decades. The IMF can be 
compared to fire fighters. Only when there happens to be a big fire, they can be interviewed 
by TV reporters.  When the fire increases, he can ask for a wage increase.  He or she may not 
be really interested in preventing fire.  Moral hazard can exist both in arson and fire fighters.  
As long as his damage can be fully insured against the fire, he will not be careful to prevent a 
fire.  With more fires, fire fighters can maintain their jobs longer or promotion may be easier.  
If he intends to be a ‘good’ fire fighter, he will devote himself to prevent the fire.   
The incentive structure of the fire fighter should be on preventing fire rather than on how 
well he extinguishes fire. Financial turmoil in developing countries could have been foreseen.  
I feel that the IMF itself is partly to blame for the recent crisis.  There should be any form of 
penalty or disadvantage to the IMF when a crisis happens. For instance the IMF pushed 
capital and financial liberalization onto developing countries, which induced a lot of capital 
inflow and made domestic banks vulnerable to external shocks. The IMF avoids 
responsibility for their policy mistakes by always attributing the crisis to debtors. They 
should have predicted side effects of fast capital liberalization. 
So far whenever crisis happens anywhere in the world, the solution was to strengthen the 
role of the IMF in whatever form. The most severe penalty will be replacing the role of the 
international lender of last resort with any other institution suggested in the previous sessions. 
When there is a fire, the solution should not be just increasing the number and budget of fire 
stations. They should have some responsibility in warning and preventing forthcoming crisis.  
Just replacing the governor of the IMF may not be sufficient enough. The incentive 
mechanism of the IMF should be redesigned so that it really is willing to prevent the crisis. 
Currently developing and poor countries are under-represented in the IMF decision-
making process. The voices of emerging market economies and poor countries in the IMF 
operation have been weak. In this context quota allocation should be improved so that it can 
reflect the economic position of those countries properly. On this issue Camdessus (2000) 
suggested replacing the G7 Summit every two years by a meeting of the heads of state and 
government of the countries —approximately 30 at any one-time — who have Executive 
Directors on the Boards of either the IMF or the World Bank and argued that this would 
provide a fair and legitimate representation of the entire membership of 182 countries.  
Further he desired to ensure permanently that each country feels properly associated to the 
decision making process. 
Crisis is in its nature contagious and regional. However, the regional aspect of crisis 
seems to not have been reflected satisfactorily. The IMF should reflect more regional 
demand for the lender of last resort. This is the only way the IMF can compete with a 
regional lender of last resort. Once it is proven that the IMF can do better than any other 
regional devices, it can survive competition. In addition non-G7 or East Asian countries 
should be able to reflect their demands collectively even inside the IMF. If the IMF is now 
the only international lender of last resort, then cooperation among non-G7 or East Asian 
countries inside the IMF is also needed to reflect their interests. 
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Here I would like to stress that the current international monetary system has definite 
flaws. One of the main factors which triggered the crisis in Korea is the weak yen before the 
crisis. Most Korean exports vying with Japanese exports in the US lost their competitiveness. 
This caused a deterioration of the current account before the crisis. This also applies to other 
East Asian countries. I mean that the current international financial system has to be 
transformed to have more stable exchange rates among the key currencies. The stability of 
major currencies is very essential for the stability of the neighbouring small open countries.  
 
4.2. Facilities for Preventing Financial Crisis 
 
One of the reasons why the harsh IMF program imposed on Korea may be that facility of 
the IMF was not so enough that their program wanted a fast result. When G-7 countries 
committed to help Korea, capital outflows could be stopped. G-7 countries actually 
performed the role of crisis manager as well as crisis lender. Therefore the voices of G-7 
countries are so strong that the negotiation power of the indebted countries is almost nothing.  
I mean that G-7’s role of crisis manager and lender cannot be impartial, as most international 
creditors are from advanced countries.   
Currently the IMF quota of Korea is just 1.6 billion SDRs (0.78 percent of the total 
SDRs). It needs to be expanded in accordance with the size of her economy. Considering that 
the maximum access limit of CCL is up to 500 percent of the member’s quota in the Fund, 
the available amount is 8.0 billion SDRs (approximately 10.3 billion dollars) only.  Even if 
we include all other sources such as stand-by and extended arrangements etc, it may not be 
enough. If we have another crisis, G-7 countries and other supporter’s help may be still 
required. Recent currency crisis is really self-fulfilling. Capital flows between countries are 
too big to be cooled down with this limited amount of lending.  
Currently the fund is too small to provide liquidity in crisis countries and further bailout 
promises by advanced countries’ commitment are unavoidable, as we have seen in Korean 
case.  In this context I agree with U.S. Treasury Secretary Summers’ proposal at a speech at 
the London Business School on December 19, 1999 that “the Fund should phase out low 
interest rate financing, forcing most countries to raise money from private sources at 
prevailing (i.e. market) interest rate (New York Times, December 15, 1999).”10 If current 
facilities are thought to be insufficient against the crisis, then the low interest rate fund such 
as PRGF11 can be supplied by other development banks such as World Bank. Table 3 shows 
that PRGF Arrangements occupy around 12 percent of the total outstanding IMF credit as of 
April 30, 2000.  I have never heard of any central bank as a domestic lender of last resort that 
is in charge of the fight against poverty in a country.12 Policy loans are not a proper function 
                                                        
10  Such a concessionary loan program in the Philippines has run for 25 years. 
11  Beginning with the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) in 1986 and then the Enhanced 
Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) in 1987, concessionary assistance to poor countries has become 
a major feature of the IMF’s work. In September 1999, the Interim Committee endorsed the 
transformation of the IMF’s concessionary lending facility-The Enhanced Structural Adjustment 
Facility (ESAF)-into the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility. The IMF combines concessionary 
lending from the IMF in support of appropriate macroeconomic policies with antipoverty assistance 
from the World Bank and other development agencies. 
12  To narrow the increasing gap between rich countries and poor countries as a result of 
globalization, the role of helping poor countries should be undertaken by any other agency such as so-
called world government rather than the IMF.  Here I am saying that it is not the essential role of the 
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of lender of last resort. However, that kind of loans often increases the power of the central 
bank and sometimes makes them corrupt. With this argument some underdeveloped 
countries may not agree. Other international institutions than the IMF should take charge of 
those concessionary loans as the cost of having a malfunctioning international lender of last 
resort may be sometimes bigger than the benefit from IMF’s concessionary loans to the poor 
countries. 
There is still a doubt whether crisis country will apply for the CCL or not.  When a 
country applies for the CCL, it is a kind of bad signalling effect.  Applying for the CCL may 
give a signal that a crisis is imminent. It is very natural that a country in difficulty will 
hesitate to use the CCL. We can recall that Korea’s initial plea for the IMF’s help signaled to 
investors that Korea was in real danger and resulted in a downgraded credit rating and 
additional capital outflows. We already saw that current crisis is really self-fulfilling and no 
country will apply for the CCL until it really faces the crisis. It means that the CCL may not 
be used as originally intended. Therefore the contingent role of the CCL will be very limited. 
Furthermore the availability of the CCL is subject to approval rather than operating as an 
autonomous system, even though eligibility has been weakened. The appropriateness of pre-
qualification to CCL may be very arbitrary and too strict for some member countries just like 
current post-crisis conditionality. The real problem of ex ante eligibility of CCL is that the 
IMF may impose the inappropriate and even unnecessary advices on the developing 
countries just like the pushing of capital account liberalization as seen in case of East Asian 
crisis. 
 
Table 3. Outstanding IMF Credit by Facility and Policy, Financial Years Ended April 30, 1997-20001) 
                                                                                                 (In millions of SDRs and percent of total) 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 
General Resources Account 34,539(85) 49,701(89) 60,651(90) 43,968(87) 
Stand-By Arrangements2) 18,064(45) 25,526(46) 25,213(38) 21,410(43) 
Extended Arrangements 11,155(28) 12,521(22) 16,574(25) 16,808(33) 
Supplemental Reserve Facility -(-) 7,100(13) 12,655(19) -(-) 
Compensatory and  
Contingency Financing  
Facility 
1,336(3) 685(1) 2,845(4) 3,032(6) 
Systematic Transformation  
Facility 
3,984(10) 3,869(7) 3,364(5) 2,718(5) 
SAF Arrangements 954(2) 730(1) 565(1) 456(1) 
PRGF Arrangements3) 4,904(12) 5,505(10) 5,870(9) 5,857(12) 
Trust Fund 90(-) 90(-) 89(-) 89(-) 
Total 40,488(100) 56,026(100) 67,175(100) 50,370(100) 
Source: the IMF Annual Report 2000: 125 
Note: 1) Numbers in the parenthesis represent the composition. 
         2) Includes outstanding credit tranche and emergency purchases. 
         3) Includes outstanding associated loans from the Saudi Fund for Development. 
 
When a country falls on crisis, the most difficult and necessary problem is trade financing.  
If trade financing stops, the country may have difficulty in financing basic external trading.  
Korea experienced that kind of problem amidst the crisis because a credit crunch often 
happens during the crisis.  Regional or global devices of trade financing should be offered 
                                                                                                                                               
IMF to be a crisis lender and manager.  Currently as the IMF took the lead in the globalization, the IMF 
may be in charge of helping poor countries.  
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for the coming crisis in the region. In this context Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) can be 
considered as lenders and guarantors of last resort for trading companies. Additionally the 
World Bank and other IFIs might consider providing a Trade Guarantee Facility, which can 
offer immediate trade financing needs together with international financial institution and the 
ECAs. 
For various reasons, it will take real time for the current global lender of last resort to 
deal with currency crisis perfectly. Therefore both global and regional lenders of last resort 
should exist in preventing and resolving the currency crisis. If the world really wants to be 
equipped with a lender of last resort, both regional and global devices should have their own 
role in dealing with currency crises. A regional lender can complement the global one as 
lender of last resort. Rose (1998) and Park and Wang (2000) argue that crisis is contagious 
and regional through regional trade linkages and that multilateral and regional approaches 
can be effective and efficient in maintaining international financial stability. We cannot deny 
that the proposal of the AMF itself has stimulated the recent self efforts of the IMF to reform 
itself. The coexistence of regional as well as global lender of last resorts will bring both 
institutions to competition. 
Compared with Mexico’ s peso crisis, Korea was discriminated by the IMF during the 
crisis in every respect. The reason may be that Mexican economy is more closely connected 
with the US economy.  This may be one of the reasons why a regional lender of last resort 
among the East Asian countries is needed. 
 
 
5.   CONCLUSION 
 
Currency crisis in Korea proved to be self-fulfilling. Proper liquidity provision from an 
international lender of last resort could have prevented the worst situation from occurring in 
Korea. While the IMF was handling the debt problem of Korea, the IMF sided with the 
creditors.  Furthermore some of the IMF conditionalities proved to be unnecessarily and even 
imposed.  
After experiencing the crisis in East Asian countries, the role of the IMF as an 
international lender of last resort is seriously challenged. Especially the IMF, who pushed 
capital and financial liberalization in developing countries, is to blame as well as the crisis 
countries themselves. Massive capital inflows in the nineties towards Asian countries 
aroused a boom and ensuing sudden capital outflows caused a bust.  
The current international financial system seems to be inefficient in preventing and 
curing the crisis all over the world. Crisis can happen in the future again without a thorough 
change of international financial institutions. Current capital liberalization would incur heavy 
defense costs such as keeping sufficient foreign reserves to capital recipient countries rather 
than contributing to the economic growth. Korea now accumulates a huge amount of foreign 
reserves after the crisis in order not to have another crisis. Foreign reserves are in some sense 
very costly to preserve. Capital is often imported with heavy interest and foreign reserves are 
kept in non-interest bearing assets. For capital liberalization to be successful, a global crisis 
lender and manager should be fully established.   
If there are any better ideas that can prevent and cure the crisis than the current IMF, the 
alternatives should be seriously discussed and accommodated wisely. Until a better 
institution arises, the IMF now should focus on its resources on preventing and curing crisis 
most effectively. Current concessionary loans that have been offered by the IMF should be 
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transferred to development banks. When redesigning the IMF reforms afterwards, regional 
and developing countries’ opinions should be respected more than ever. I think that regional 
as well as global lenders of last resort are desperately needed to prevent and cure crisis 
efficiently because regional institution can meet the needs of neighbouring countries that 
share similar problems better. So far this movement is the best hope for the IMF to be 
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